CHAPTER 6

Prosocial motivation and local political leadership

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ABSTRACT

Investigating the associations between five leadership indicators, public service motivation (PSM), and sense of community responsibility (SOC-R), this chapter integrates insights from Public Administration and Community Psychology into the study of local political leadership. We ask how PSM and SOC-R are associated with (present and potential future) formal positions among local councillors and their behaviours in these positions. We answer this question based on a nationwide survey of Danish local councillors (n = 946). The key findings are that PSM is associated with having a formal leadership position (mayor or committee chair) in the present election term, while SOC-R is associated with the intention to run for re-election, transformational leadership, and the use of verbal recognition. Neither PSM nor SOC-R is associated with consensus building. Our findings suggest that PSM and SOC-R are both relevant for local political leadership, but that other factors (e.g., membership of the dominant coalition and perceived influence) should also be considered.

Keywords: political leadership, local government, public service motivation, sense of community responsibility.

INTRODUCTION

Both political leadership behaviour and the context in which it takes place are important for goal attainment in public organisations (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2019). Other chapters in this book address how local government institutions are organised and governed, so this chapter focuses on local political leadership in a given context. Inspired by insights from Public Administration and Community Psychology, we analyse the associations between prosocial motivation and political leadership behaviours. This is also relevant for the relationship between politics and administration because several of the investigated political leadership behaviours are directed towards the administration.

Public Administration scholars normally study administrative leaders such as agency heads or school principals, but their insights are also relevant for elected leaders' leadership behaviours. Antonakis and Day emphasized that leadership takes place in a particular context when they define it as "a formal or informal contextually rooted and goal-influencing process that occurs between a leader and a follower, group of followers, or institutions" (2017, p. 6). This is especially relevant when examining local political leadership because the elected members of local councils exert influence in their own local communities.

Until recently, public choice theory largely monopolized the motivational understanding of politicians, portraying them as extrinsically motivated (Strøm, 1990). The focus of public service motivation (PSM) research (Perry & Wise 1990; Ritz, Brewer & Neumann, 2016) on *employed* personnel means that researchers have largely overlooked the crucial role of prosocial motivation for *elected* public leaders. PSM can be defined as "an individual's orientation to delivering services to people with a purpose to do good for others and society" (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008, p. 7). Prosocial motivation, meanwhile, can be defined as the desire to expend effort to benefit other people (Grant, 2008, p. 48), and hence encompasses both employed personnel and elected leaders. It is a serious limitation that PSM does not include elected political leaders. Political leaders often face harsh working conditions, including long working hours and pressure (Bhatti et al., 2017; Bhatti et al., 2016). Furthermore, local elected politicians are formal leaders with great responsibility and considerable power, depending on their position in the council (Jacobsen, 2006). Hence, prosocial motivation is relevant to understanding local political leadership behaviours. This points out the need for a scientific agenda on the motivation and leadership of politicians. This chapter thus begins to study the motivational forces behind political leadership. More specifically, we investigate the associations between five leadership indicators, PSM, and sense of community responsibility (also known as SOC-R), which is the "feelings of duty and obligation to take action to advance the well-being of a specific group and its members that is not directly rooted in an expectation of personal gain" (Nowell et al., 2016, p. 665).


FIGURE 6.1: Five investigated behaviours

As illustrated in Figure 6.1, local politicians have different occasions to step up. Immediately after an election, they can try to become a committee chair or even mayor. As an ordinary member, chair, or mayor, they can exert different types of leadership behaviour. Do they set direction through a clear vision, recognize their (administrative) followers' efforts and results, and/or build consensus in the municipal council? Toward the end of their term, they decide whether they

are willing to seek re-election. Some of these indicators have been studied for administrative leaders. Setting direction and recognizing efforts and results can be seen as forms of transformational and transactional leadership (Jensen et al., 2019). Not seeking re-election resembles a turnover intention (Podsakoff et al., 2012). Consensus building is a specific political leadership behaviour, which is central to the accumulation of political capital and decision-making power (Kjær, 2013; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002).

Inspired by numerous Public Administration and Community Psychology scholars (Moynihan et al., 2012; Andersen et al., 2014; Nowell et al., 2016), we focus on two types of prosocial motivation: PSM and SOC-R. Local politicians live in the municipality and invest time and effort in political work to affect the public service provision in a particular community, suggesting that SOC-R is relevant. While SOC-R, as mentioned above, pertains to feelings of duty and an obligation to take action to advance the well-being of a specific group and its members (Nowell et al. 2016, p. 665), PSM is a more general aim to do good for other people through public service provision. Given the extensive literature on public managers' PSM (e.g., Moynihan et al., 2012), including PSM in the analysis enables us to reflect on similarities and differences between political and administrative leaders. This means that key concepts from both the public leadership literature (e.g., Vogel & Masal, 2015; Chapman et al., 2016; Van Wart, 2013) and the literature on power relations in local councils (e.g., Berg & Kjær, 2007; Kjær, 2015; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Stone, 1989) are relevant.

We study both formal positions and behaviours within these positions. Positions include whether local politicians have succeeded in having a leadership position in the investigated electoral term and whether the individuals are willing to seek re-election to a political position in the future. Three behaviours within these positions are especially relevant: transformational leadership, verbal recognition, and consensus building. The theory section discusses the expectations and relevant background variables when studying the associations between the two motivational constructs (PSM and SOC-R) and the five leadership indicators. Our goal was to find out what motivates individuals to "step up", assume political leadership positions in local communities, and behave as leaders in such positions. More specifically, the research question is:

How are PSM and SOC-R associated with (present and future) formal positions among local councillors and their leadership behaviours?

The empirical data emanate from a nationwide survey of local councillors in Denmark. This country was selected because the 98 Danish municipalities are highly comparable in terms of areas of responsibility and fundamental institutions. Our unique dataset allowed us to understand variations in elected politicians' leadership based on their prosocial motivation (PSM and SOC-R).

The next section presents the key concepts and develops expectations concerning the associations between these. This is followed by descriptions of the data, methods, and results and finally a discussion and conclusion with suggestions for future research.

LEADERSHIP EXERTED BY ELECTED COUNCILLORS LINKED TO THEIR MOTIVATION

Below, we discuss first how politicians can express their goals and visions (transformational leadership) and communicate with the administrative level (verbal recognition). We then explain why consensus building is a central feature of political leadership, linking this to a discussion of the institutional context and the relevance of different positions (chair/mayor and re-election). Finally, we present our expectations of the associations between these leadership indicators and the two types of prosocial motivation.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP INDICATORS

Our choice of transformational (also sometimes called visionary) leadership as one of our investigated leadership behaviours is in line with many different parts of the existing literature. Dag Ingvar Jacobsen (2015, p. 29) argued that leaders in high publicness contexts have prosocial motivation and that this factor increases the use of transformational leadership. His empirical analysis of 2488 Norwegian leaders confirmed that prosocial motivation and transformational leadership are positively associated. Paul t'Hart (2014, p. 23) argued that politicians construct identities and select public policy goals, whereas administrators (among other behaviours) direct public organisations and make government work on the front line. Politicians construct identities by weaving credible narratives about *who* and *what* they embody (t'Hart, 2014, p. 23). These narratives are based on values, and the politicians continuously clarify what they see as desirable. Their articulation of policy can thus be seen as an ongoing description of an attractive future; in other words, a vision. Grint argued that "visions are designed through the imagination … they are paintings, not photographs" (2000, p. 28). This is about inspiring confidence, motivation, and a sense of purpose in followers through the articulation of a clear vision for the future; here, the leader's own enthusiasm and commitment to the goals are important. This facet of leadership is well captured by the visionary element of transformational leadership.

The concept of transformational leadership was originally applied to political leadership (Burns, 1978), but has subsequently been used extensively to study

administrative public leadership (Vogel & Masal, 2015). We follow the recent focus on the visionary aspect (Van Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013; cf. however Bass, 1998), which conceptualizes transformational leadership as "a set of behaviours that seek to develop, share, and sustain a vision intended to encourage employees to transcend their own self-interest and achieve organizational goals" (Jacobsen & Andersen, 2015, p. 832). Transformational leadership can be undertaken both individually (especially for mayors and committee chairs) and collectively (the whole council).

This is also the case for the second type of leadership behaviour: *verbal recognition*. The traditional leadership literature (e.g., Bass, 1985, 1998) differentiates between several types of transactional leadership involving different ways to reward or sanction followers according to their contributions to organisational goal attainment. Very few local councillors can use material rewards and sanctions in relation to managers and employees in their municipality, but they are all able to express support and give positive feedback. To capture a transaction-oriented type of leadership (Andersen et al., 2018), we include verbal recognition, understood as the politicians' expressions of support, trust, and positive feedback toward administrative leaders and employees who have achieved good results and/or exerted high levels of effort. This corresponds to t'Hart and Tummers' (2019, p. 51) argument that politicians can make civil servants do their utmost to further the politicians' causes by keeping their part of the "public service bargain" by using the fair stewardship of the conditions and rewards of the public service. Because we want to have a broad conceptualization of the local councillors' behaviour related to the communication with administrators, we include: (a) individual verbal recognition behaviour, (b) support behaviour as part of the council, and (c) the councillors' general expressions of trust toward the administrative level.

t'Hart and Tummers (2019, p. 51) argued that a key task for politicians is to build winning political coalitions and protect them over time. In a local government context, Kjær (2013) argued that especially mayors must form alliances and build consensus to reach their political goals. We therefore include *consensus building* (whether individual councillors seek broad consensus) instead of the norm of consensus, which, according to Kjær (2013, p. 262), characterizes the entire Danish local political realm.

Consensus building has been theorized as a process whereby actors seek to accumulate political capital (Banfield & Wilson, 2017; Berg & Kjær, 2007; Kjær, 2013), which is seen as a power credit. If political actors view the outcome of the political process as successful, they endow the local political leader with political capital. The local political leader can then invest and use the influence gained to have a say on policy formulation and implementation (Kjær 2013,

p. 265). This capital can also be re-invested in future decision-making. Thus, building consensus is a core feature of gaining long-term political influence and hence it is linked to tenure and position in the councils. Given that qualitative case studies indicate that it is learnt on the job (Berg & Kjær, 2007), consensus building is expected to be associated with holding a formal position and tenure, rather than to a particular type of motivation. It is thus seen as a role behaviour based on a logic of appropriateness, which is embedded in the particular institutional context in the local councils (see March & Olsen, 1989). While prosocial motivations are important in order to understand why people take on a social responsibility and a leadership position, we expect the institutions in the democratic assembly to sustain consensus building as the appropriate behaviour if political capital is to be accumulated.

The institutional set-up of Danish local councils specifically supports consensus building as an appropriate behaviour. The weak mayoral system formally vests decision-making authority in the town or city council, similar to the U.S. council-manager system (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). In principle, power is in the hands of the local council, but things are more complex in practice, since the real executive power is shared among the council, the standing committees, the finance committee, and the mayor (Kjær, 2013). The councillors receive committee assignments according to proportional representation, which helps secure a broad representation of diverging political interests. The committees also have decision-making competencies over the daily administration of their particular area (Berg, 2004). Thus, the local councillors are responsible for a sector in cooperation with fellow councillors from other political parties. This, in turn, institutionalizes a consensus-building process that cuts across party lines (Berg & Kjær, 2007; Kjær, 2013, 2015).

In this setup, the power struggle does not concern control and resistance, but instead concerns gaining and accumulating the capacity to act; that is, "the power to" rather than "the power over" (Stone, 1989, p. 229). In this view, influence is based on the interactions in the council. Councillors are not only potential rivals on election day, but also potential allies in devising processes and shaping goals (Stone, 2012). They can seek to obtain influence on different aspects of political life, including both agenda-setting and decision-making (Pedersen, 2014, p. 891). While this perspective points to influence as more than a formal position, formal position still matters. The formal positions *within* the council vary between local councillors, committee chairs, and mayors; and the higher in the hierarchy, the greater the influence that is vested in the formal position.

This is highly relevant for leadership behaviour in relation to *future* positions. In a healthy democracy, the electorate decides on Election Day who will

be part of the council. Yet politicians can also retire voluntarily, for example, be unwilling to be re-elected. If politicians retire voluntarily in large numbers, this can become a democratic problem. While some politicians retire for various practical or personal reasons (e.g., because they move to another municipality, or simply due to age), it is highly relevant to examine politicians' perceived influence (on agenda-setting as well as decision-making), because it is plausible that politicians without influence would be less willing to be re-elected.

POLITICIANS' MOTIVATION

Existing research indicates that the most important similarity between political and administrative elites is their wish to contribute to, improve, and/or serve society (van der Wal, 2013, p. 753–4). Pedersen (2014) also found that PSM is relevant for local councillors as a specific group. Given that their jurisdiction covers the local communities in which the councillors also live, it is relevant to include SOC-R. We are not claiming that financial gain, re-election, or power are unimportant, but that the incentives vary based on the size of the municipality and that these aspects have been investigated elsewhere. Below, we highlight the key similarities and differences between PSM and SOC-R (the relationship between the two concepts has been analysed in more detail elsewhere, using the same dataset as this chapter; see Pedersen et al., 2020).

As mentioned, PSM can be defined as "an individual's orientation to delivering services to people with a purpose to do good for others and society" (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008, p. 7), whereas SOC-R is a "feeling of duty and obligation to take action to advance the well-being of a specific group and its members that is not directly rooted in an expectation of personal gain" (Nowell et al., 2016, p. 665). The key difference is that while PSM is general, SOC-R is linked to acting in relation to a specific group. It thus has a specific recipient (the community and its members), while PSM is oriented toward others and society in general. SOC-R is specifically act-relevant (meaning that individuals feel personally obligated to do good for others, cf. Le Grand, 2003), while PSM can encompass act-relevant as well as act-irrelevant aspects. This suggests that PSM is linked more strongly to holding a formal position, as the motivation to do good can be exercised through the behaviour of others when a person holds a formal leadership position. The act-relevance of SOC-R suggests that this type of motivation is more strongly associated with behaviour involving working with others, such as verbal recognition. There are also similarities between PSM and SOC-R. The literature of both these outline feelings of duty, obligation, and commitment to others as important and are grounded in pro-

cess-type theories emphasizing the role of institutional norms, values, and beliefs (Nowell & Boyd, 2010; Perry, 1996).

In line with these arguments, PSM can be acted upon in many different contexts, depending on the societal impact potential (Andersen & Kjeldsen, 2013), while the community is a source of energy and motivation in the SOC-R literature (Brincker & Pedersen, 2020). A municipality comprises a geographical community (as is the case in this chapter), but communities can also be relational and even virtual. While PSM is rooted in a general calling to public service, sense of community is thus relational and linked to the willingness to engage to achieve group goals within a specific community setting (Nowell & Boyd, 2010; Nowell et al., 2016).

EXPECTED ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN MOTIVATION AND LEADERSHIP

In terms of taking on leadership positions, it is plausible that high PSM individuals more actively seek to become the mayor and committee chair, and that PSM is activated when individuals have these positions as it allows them to do good for others and society (Pedersen, 2014). This implies a positive association between position and PSM. For similar reasons, SOC-R is expected to be associated with leadership positions in the council: mayors and committee chairs can better advance the well-being of the community and its members.

Transformational leadership behaviour is expected to be highly relevant for individuals with both types of prosocial motivation. This connects back to the shared background in duty, obligation, commitment to others, and the strong emphasis on values highlighted in both literatures. Transformational leadership is a way to convince others about your own understanding of "what is desirable", which is relevant for both high PSM individuals and those with high SOC-R. Articulating a vision does not necessarily mean that the vision is limited to the geographical area; municipalities can also have visions about their contribution to global sustainability.

Verbal recognition is most relevant for SOC-R because it builds on (personal) relationships with others within the community, but it can also be relevant for high PSM individuals if they hold leadership positions. A leader with high PSM might use verbal recognition to promote their prosocial goals. Still, the expectation is not as strong as for the expected association between SOC-R and verbal recognition, and the (positive) association between PSM and verbal recognition is therefore in parentheses (consult Table 6.1).

Concerning consensus building, we do not expect PSM or SOC-R to be positively associated with councillors' attempts to build consensus. Consensus building is a role-driven behaviour, which is based on a logic of appropriateness

institutionalised in the political assembly in the local councils. It accumulates political capital and is important to make the coalition stick together. Therefore, consensus building is expected to be linked to formal position, tenure and being part of the coalition, rather than to individual motivational factors.

Both PSM and SOC-R can be relevant in the intention to run for re-election. The association might be stronger for SOC-R than PSM, because SOC-R is highly act-relevant, whereas PSM can be both act-relevant and act-irrelevant. In this chapter, we investigate SOC-R as being tied to (and created in) the municipality, while high PSM can manifest in many other contexts, because the type of prosocial motivation is more general. Given that re-election will still provide a platform for doing good for public service motivated individuals, the positive association between PSM and the intention to run for re-election is shown in parentheses in Table 6.1.

TABLE 6.1:   Theoretical expectations

Types of political behaviour (leadership indicators)	Expected association with PSM	Expected association with SOC-R
Taking on leadership positions	Positive	Positive
Exerting transformational leadership	Positive	Positive
Offering verbal recognition	(Positive)	Positive
Building consensus	No expected association	No expected association
Intending to run for re-election	(Positive)	Positive

DATA AND METHODS

Data was collected in January 2019 as part of survey data collection focused on motivation and leadership behaviour among local councillors in all 98 municipalities in Denmark. These local authorities are the lowest level of formal government and have multiple functions (e.g., eldercare, schools, and garbage collection, for more details see Blom-Hansen & Heeager, 2011). The local council members are elected to four-year terms, and the number of councillors (9–55) depends on the municipal population. Each council has a number of standing committees (typically around five, but often more for large municipalities and fewer for small municipalities). The chairs and mayor are selected for the entire election term, typically as part of a coalition agreement immediately after the election. The data was collected in an email-based questionnaire sent to all 2,463 local councillors. A total of 946 council members responded (38% response rate), which is slightly higher than similar e-mail-based studies (Bhatti et al., 2017).

A non-response analysis shows an overrepresentation of mayors and councillors who are not part of the dominant coalition, while characteristics such as gender, party, region, and municipality are balanced. The overrepresentation of mayors is an advantage for the study's validity given how the analysis focuses on the associations between political leadership and motivation, and the overrepresentation renders the mayor-related results more robust.

LEADERSHIP INDICATORS: POSITIONS AND THE BEHAVIOUR WITHIN THESE POSITIONS

Formal leadership position varies from being an ordinary member to a committee chair to mayor. It is an ordinal scale variable given that the strength of the position clearly increases from ordinary member to committee chair to mayor (all mayors are also finance committee chairs). Formal position is self-reported, but we expect the measure to be valid as it is a factual question. To obtain information regarding the councillors' intention to run for re-election, we asked them whether they intended to do so in the next municipal election. We know that the answer is hypothetical inasmuch as we asked in January 2019 about a decision which would be made in the summer of 2021 for the elections to be held in the autumn that year. Still, the question captures the *willingness* to take on a future position in a valid way.

Transformational leadership is a self-reported measure of the extent to which the councillor specifies a vision and sets direction as part of the local council. The measure is inspired by Jensen et al. (2019). An example of the three items (see Table A1 in the online Appendix) agrees with the following statement: "As a member of the local council, I contribute to specifying a clear vision for the future of the municipality." Cronbach's alpha is satisfactory for the index constructed based on the three items (0.69).

Verbal recognition is a self-reported measure of the extent to which the councillors report three types of recognition of managers and employees in their communication with the administrative level in the municipality. Three items (see Table A1) measure positive feedback, support, and trust. An example is the agreement with the statement, "As part of my committee work, I contribute to giving the top managers positive feedback if their functional area performs well." Cronbach's alpha is acceptable for the index constructed based on the three items (0.64).

Consensus building behaviour is measured using seven self-reported questions about the extent to which the councillor works to build consensus in the local council. As mentioned, we are not trying to capture a consensus norm (typically measured using questions such as "The most important decisions in

the council are taken in unanimity" [Houlberg & Pedersen, 2015, p. 85]). Instead, we seek to measure the individual engagement with building consensus. An example of the items we use to measure consensus building (all of which are listed in Table A1) is "In my local council, I work toward achieving a majority consisting of as many of the represented parties as possible." Cronbach's alpha is highly satisfactory for the index constructed based on the seven items (0.76).

PROSOCIAL MOTIVATION

PSM is measured using a five-item global measure (see Appendix A), which is an abridged version of the original PSM measure (Perry, 1996). It would have been preferable to include different dimensions to be able to investigate how the dimensions (i.e., attraction to public policymaking, commitment to the public interest, compassion, and self-sacrifice) relate to leadership behaviours. We had to limit the number of items in the survey, but a more comprehensive measure of PSM could be included in future studies. A similar abbreviated measure has been used and validated in multiple studies (Kim, 2017; Wright et al., 2013). Cronbach's alpha is 0.81, which is highly satisfactory (see also online Appendix Table A1).

SOC-R is measured using the items developed by Pedersen, Andersen, and Thomsen (2020), which are adapted from the items used by Boyd and Nowell (2017) and Nowell et al. (2016). Importantly, the original SOC-R items use "partnership" as the community setting, while the present survey uses "municipality". The specific wording of the items can be found in Table A1. The four survey items were summarized in an overall index, and the reliability analysis showed a relatively good scale consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.67).

METHODS

We use multiple regressions to test all the expectations (OLS, ordinal, or logistic regression, depending on the measurement scale of the leadership indicators). As such, we are analysing associations, not causal effects, and our use of regression analysis means that we specify the five aspects of political leadership as the dependent variables, while PSM and SOC-R are independent variables. We find this sequence most plausible, but we are also aware that the causal direction could be different. Causality is obviously interesting, but it demands at least panel studies and preferably quasi-experimental designs to identify effects when the variables can plausibly affect each other both ways. Importantly, we expect one of the indicators, namely formal position, to be potentially important for the other four indicators, because councillors' positions are relevant for the

types of leadership behaviour they can use. We therefore include a model with control for formal position.

We include several variables in the analysis to avoid spurious associations (see Table A1 in the online Appendix for specific operationalisations). Most importantly, we present analyses of re-election intention both with and without influence, because it can be an important (but potentially endogenous) factor. The index (with six items) captures influence on both agenda-setting and decision-making and has a satisfactory Cronbach's alpha (0.81). All models control for age, gender, education level, size of the municipality (number of citizens), tenure (number of periods served in the local council), and whether the councillor is a member of the dominant coalition. The last two variables are potentially endogenous, but the coefficients for PSM and SOC-R are similar regardless of whether they are included (see the online Appendix).

Three of the leadership indicators and both types of motivation are subjective, self-reported measures, which renders potential common source bias a serious concern, especially because there is reason to be concerned that some of the items may be subject to social desirability bias, which can lead to false positives (Meier & O'Toole, 2013). This is the rationale for referring to association rather than effects.

ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN PSM/SOC-R AND THE FIVE ASPECTS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The results are presented in the six models in Table 6.2. Models 2.1 to 2.5 analyse each of the leadership indicators, while Model 2.6 is an additional analysis of re-election intention including influence.

Model 2.1 (and Table A2 in the online appendix) shows that PSM is positively associated with formal position, while there is no significant association between SOC-R and formal position. This last result was not aligned with our expectation. One possible explanation is that all positions are part of the community and allow politicians to contribute to the community. However, previous research has found positive associations between SOC-R and formal leadership position (Nowell et al., 2016). Hence, more research is needed to clarify this result. Model 2.1 also shows positive associations between position and (1) membership of the dominant coalition and (2) tenure. Membership of the dominant coalition can facilitate the success of the individual in becoming mayor or a committee chair. Similarly, having experience in terms of a higher number of election terms in the council increases the chances of becoming mayor or committee chair. Controlling for tenure, age is negatively associated with formal position. If two local councillors have the same political experience,

the older one is less likely to have a formal position. This is because seniority is a driver of political career, while age is a driver of retirement.

Model 2.2 in Table 6.2 shows that SOC-R is positively associated with transformational leadership. This is the case for all alternative model specifications, while PSM is not positively associated with transformational leadership when SOC-R is included in the analysis (see Table A3 in the Appendix for details). In addition to SOC-R, transformational leadership is positively associated with membership of the dominant coalition and formal position. Mayors are most active for this type of behaviour, followed by committee chairs. There are indications that female councillors (controlled for position) use this type of behaviour slightly more than male councillors. These results supported our expectation of a positive association with SOC-R.

As expected, Model 2.4 shows that neither PSM nor SOC-R are associated with consensus building. The latter is positively associated with membership of the dominant coalition and formal position. Mayors are the most active with respect to building consensus, followed by committee chairs. Higher tenure seems to give more consensus building, while female councillors and councillors in large municipalities use less consensus building. In sum, consensus building was not related to individual motivational factors but embedded in the institutionalization of the formal positions in the council. Table A5 in the Appendix shows that the findings are robust in terms of alternative specifications.

Model 2.5 (and Table A6) shows that SOC-R is positively associated with the intention to run for re-election, while there is no significant association between PSM and re-election intention. Mayors have a significantly higher intention to run for re-election than all other councillors, and committee chairs have a higher intention than ordinary members. Model 2.6 indicates that this is at least partially due to their higher influence. Finally, high tenure and high age mean less intention to run for re-election, and male councillors have a slightly higher intention to run for re-election compared to their female counterparts. In sum, our analysis of the intention to run for re-election supported our expectation of a positive association with SOC-R, but went against our expectations regarding a potential positive association between PSM and the intention to run for re-election.

TABLE 6.2: Relationships between PSM, SOC-R, and leadership behaviours (unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. See detail in Online Appendix Tables A1-A8 at: https://ps.au.dk/fileadmin/Statskundskab/CPL/Hjemmeside/online_appendix.pdf

	Model 2.1 Council position	Model 2.2 Transformational leadership	Model 2.3 Verbal recognition	Model 2.4 Consensus building	Model 2.5 Re-election intention	Model 2.6 Re-election intention
Type of regression	Ordinal regression	OLS	OLS	OLS	Logistic regression	Logistic regression
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	0.065 (0.172)	−0.022* (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.022† (0.013)	0.498† (0.257)	0.448† (0.258)
Age (# years)	−0.028** (0.009)	−0.0003 (0.0005)	−0.001** (0.0005)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.058** (0.017)	−0.056** (0.017)
Municipality size (# thousand citizens)	−0.003** (0.001)	0.00007 (0.00005)	−0.0001† (0.00005)	−0.0002** (0.0001)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)
Education	*Control for 10 education categories. See table note for details.*					
PSM (0–1, 1 = high)	1.205† (0.654)	−0.077† (0.041)	−0.044 (0.049)	−0.016 (0.049)	−0.859 (1.031)	−0.317 (1.019)
SOC-R (0–1, 1 = high)	0.365 (0.711)	0.319** (0.061)	0.283** (0.067)	0.049 (0.056)	2.163* (1.062)	1.459 (1.106)
Member of coalition (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.946** (0.281)	0.045** (0.014)	0.036* (0.015)	0.046** (0.016)	0.050 (0.293)	−0.021 (0.302)
Tenure (# election cycles)	0.295** (0.045)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006† (0.003)	−0.129* (0.060)	−0.152* (0.063)
Position (Ref.: member) Committee chair Mayor		0.059** (0.013) 0.079** (0.019)	0.044** (0.011) 0.085** (0.018)	0.041** (0.015) 0.120** (0.023)	0.595† (0.306) 1.974** (0.725)	0.250 (0.314) 1.329† (0.722)
Influence (0–1, 1 = high)						2.992** (0.923)
Constant		0.600** (0.069)	0.641** (0.072)	0.584** (0.066)	3.156* (1.348)	2.110 (1.424)
N	728	728	728	728	595	595

Notes: †$p < 0.1$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$. Cluster robust standard errors (municipalities) in parentheses.

Dependent variables: Model 2.1: 0=ordinary member, 1=committee chair, 2=mayor, Models 2.2 + 2.3 + 2.4: Indexes scaled from 0 to 1. Models 2.5 + 2.6: No intent to run for re-election coded as 0. Intent to run for re-election coded as 1.

Independent variables: PSM, SOC-R, and influence are scaled from 0–1. Education is a categorical variable with the following categories: primary and lower secondary school, upper secondary school, vocational upper secondary education, vocational qualification, vocational

qualification and upper secondary school, short-cycle higher education, medium-cycle higher education, undergraduate/bachelor program, long-cycle higher education, and Ph.D.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter investigated how two types of prosocial motivation, PSM and SOC-R, are associated with leadership behaviour in Danish local councils. Transformational leadership is relevant to the municipality as a whole, verbal recognition is exercised toward the administration, and consensus building is relevant to leadership in the council. The results showed that PSM is associated with holding a formal position as chair or mayor and that SOC-R is associated with willingness to be re-elected, transformational leadership, and verbal recognition. Neither motivational construct is associated with consensus building.

The results highlighted the relevance of including both SOC-R and PSM in future studies of political leadership. PSM and SOC-R are both prosocial motivational forms, but they diverge in numerous ways. The key difference is that SOC-R captures the motivation linked to working for a geographically delimited community, and this is important when studying local political leaders, because local politics happens within a geographically limited area (a polity). The motivation to take responsibility for a community can be the foundation and steppingstone to becoming motivated to do good for others and society in general.

While PSM and SOC-R offer valuable insights to understanding political leadership behaviours, such as transformational leadership and accepting leadership positions, neither concept was associated with consensus building. Instead, we found that variations in coalition membership, position, and municipality size are linked to differences in the politicians' consensus building. This points toward the relevance of the institutional setup. Specifically, the institutions determine what it takes to accumulate political capital and decision-making capacity in democratic assemblies. If politicians are not only prosocially motivated but also seek votes and offices for self-interested reasons (Strøm, 1990), institutions such as electoral systems and party structures are highly relevant, because they determine whether behaviours such as consensus building contribute to self-interest maximization. Even for politicians motivated primarily by prosocial motivation, re-election can be important to realize long-term goals, and perceived influence is important for re-election intentions, suggesting that political leaders need to feel that they make a difference in order to be willing to continue their political work.

The larger claim is, therefore, that future studies of political leadership should include different motivational factors, pay attention to the interaction between motivation and institutions, and maintain the focus on classical factors

such as perceived influence. Democratic institutions must be taught, learned, and re-institutionalized continuously, and this chapter illustrates that prosocial motivation is relevant for politicians' willingness to continue doing that. Both the general motivation to do good for others and society and the more specific commitment to a community should thus be taken into account in future research and in practical arrangements aimed at facilitating coherent local political leadership.

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